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CASE COMMENTS
controlling when in direct conflict with state law. However, in
Ragan the Court held that the local state policy was controlling
when in conflict with federal rule three. In the principal case,
the district court upheld the spirit of the Hanna decision, declaring
that federal rule three is controlling when in conflict with state law.
Although the decision in the principal case supplements Hanna
and seems to be moving toward the establishment of uniformity
in the federal courts in matters of procedure, the picture is still
very cloudy. Since Hanna did not expressly overrule the decision
in Ragan, all one can do is speculate what future decisions of the
Supreme Court will be in this area. Until a final determination of
this question, the prudent attorney will protect his client by
meeting the requirements of both the federal and state rule.
William Jack Stevens
Federal Courts-Prosecution of Officers under the Civil Rights Acts
D's, a county attorney and his deputy, filed and prosecuted a
complaint charging F, a sixteen year old girl, with first degree
murder. Following her arrest, P alleged that she was confined to
a drunk tank for twenty-five days without a preliminary hearing.
Moreover, P claimed she was taken outside the county in further-
ance of an unsuccessful attempt to obtain her confession. P also
was allegedly taken to the scene of the crime where attempts
were made to intimidate her into confessing. Upon being released,
P filed a complaint charging that Ds, while acting under color of
state law, exceeded their jurisdiction and deprived her of rights
secured by the federal constitution. The United States District
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The federal
appellate court ruled that the real issue was whether P had stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Held, reversed. The
complaint did state a cause of action. Ds, as prosecuting attorneys,
are entitled to a limited immunity because of their quasi-judicial
roles. However, if a prosecuting attorney commits acts which are
related to police activity as opposed to judicial activity, the cloak
of immunity no longer protects him. Here, if Ds alleged acts
were in the nature of police acts, they clearly were beyond the
scope of judicial immunity. Rxv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1958) grants federal courts the jurisdiction to hear cases
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brought by persons whose constitutional rights have been violated
by wrongdoers acting under color of state law. Robichaud v. Ronan,
351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965).
Courts have created a distinction between acts of public officers
which are regarded as discretionary or quasi-judicial and those
which are ministerial. Those acts which are quasi-judicial in
character require personal deliberation and judgment, while those
which are ministerial amount only to an obedience to orders. Only
those officers who perform quasi-judicial acts are afforded a cer-
tain degree of immunity in their performance. The acts of a prose-
cuting attorney fall within this characterization. Pitossi, Towrs
§ 126 (3d ed. 1964). However, if a prosecuting attorney acts be-
yond the scope of his authority, he is no longer clothed with
immunity and is subject to liability just as an ordinary citizen
would be. Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
The determination of whether state officers have exceeded the
scope of their authority, thus becoming subject to liability, tradition-
ally has been a question which state courts have handled. How-
ever, recent cases dealing with this topic indicate a significant
trend - that of federal courts taking jurisdiction without exhaus-
tion of state remedies. This trend is the result of the application
of the Civil Rights Acts. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
Roberts v. Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
The Civil Rights Acts are the result of the War Between the
States. In order to protect the rights of newly freed Negroes,
Congress enacted five statutes, collectively called the Civil Rights
Acts. Today, although most of the provisions have been repealed
or greatly limited, some important remnants remain. 49 CALIF. L.
REv. 145 (1961). Among those remaining are two sections, 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1958) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), which give the
federal courts jurisdiction of claims growing out of a deprivation
of the rights of any person by an officer acting under the color of
state law. The former section provides for a criminal action for
such deprivation while the latter makes possible a civil suit.
For many years following the War Between the States the courts
struggled with the question of whether the Civil Rights Acts were
intended to provide a federal remedy if the state courts provided
a like remedy. Lower federal courts initially held that the acts
did not provide a concurrent federal remedy. 1961 Durr L. J.
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452, 455. However, more recent decisions have held that a supple-
mentary federal remedy was intended. McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 671, (1962); Monroe v. Pape, supra.
The first Supreme Court case holding that the Civil Rights Acts
did give federal courts a supplementary remedy with state courts
was United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). In this case the
Court held that state election officials acted under the color of
state law within the meaning of section twenty of the Criminal
Code, now 18 U.S.C. § 424 (1958), when they altered ballots in
a federal election in contravention of a state law.
In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Court re-
affirmed the interpretation in United States v. Classic, supra, given
to section twenty of the Criminal Code. Alfange, Under Color of
Law: Classic and Screws Revisted, 47 Corr.r. L. Q. 395, 406
(1962). The Court held that police officers acted "under color of
state law" when they maliciously assaulted a prisoner while
arresting him. However, a vigorous dissent in this five-four decision
was based on the argument that the Civil Rights Acts were not
intended to provide a federal remedy when a state officer was
subject to punishment in a state court.
After the Supreme Court decisions in Screws and Classic, several
lower courts extended the Supreme Court's application of criminal
liability for wrongful acts committed under color of state law to
the civil liability provisions of the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U. S. C. §
1983 (1958). 1961 DU=E L. J., supra at 456. In Lewis v. Brauti-
gain, supra, the court held that a quasi-judicial officer, such as a
prosecuting attorney, acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction
and without authority of law, cannot shelter himself from liability
to private citizens under the Civil Rights Acts by a plea that he
was acting under color of office. Other courts, however, took a
more restrictive view of the application of the Civil Rights Acts. In
Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959), the court held that
state attorneys and assistant state attorneys were immune to civil
actions under the Civil Rights Acts for their actions in connection
with official prosecutions. The court rejected the holding in Lewis
v. Brautigam, supra, because the great weight of authority was
contrary.
The culmination of this controversy came with Monroe v. Pape,
supra, a case involving the prosecution of policemen who had
19661
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committed unauthorized acts. The Supreme Court held that the
misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
because the wrongdoer was clothed with authority of state law
can be prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). With reference
to the statutes in question, the Court stated that one reason for this
legislation was to give federal courts the right to pass judgment
without exhaustion of state remedies where state remedies might not
be enforced. Therefore, this case confers original jurisdiction of
civil suits in federal courts when brought under the Civil Rights
Acts. 1961 Du=a L. J., supra at 457.
As a result of Monroe v. Pape, federal courts have applied the
Civil Rights Acts with increasing liberality in cases involving
wrongful acts committed under color of state law. In Roberts v.
Trapnell, supra, the court held that an allegation of facts constitut-
ing a deprivation, made under color of state authority, of a right
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is all that is necessary
to state a cause of action. Others cases similarly holding include
Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963); Bargainer v.
Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Beauregard v. Win-
gard, 230 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
The trend as indicated has been toward a more liberal application
of the Civil Rights Acts by the federal courts. The principal case
supports this trend. A quasi-judicial officer on the federal level
may no longer be shielded from liability when he exceeds his
authority. The effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958) is to allow district
courts to sit in judgment of activities of officials on all levels of
state and local governments. 49 CAiF. L. REv., supra at 170.
Exhaustion of state remedies is no longer required.
States apparently are reluctant to relinquish original jurisdiction
of cases involving officers who have violated a person's rights while
acting under color of state law. However, the Civil Rights Acts
were passed to afford persons a federal right when because of
"prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced," Monroe v. Pape, supra, and citizens would
be denied rights secured by the federal constitution. Yet, where
a state promptly prosecutes violators, it may be contended properly
that the federal government should not take jurisdiction. 47 CoiR-
NFLL L. Q. 395 (1961). Until this is done in all the states, however,
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the Civil Rights Acts apparently will be applied whenever a public
officer exceeds his authority.
Hazel Armenta Straub
Income Tax-Corporate Reorganizations-Spin-offs
A corporation had been engaged in the manufacture and sale of
agricultural machinery for several years. Most of its business was
concentrated in the Midwest, and it had been conducting operations
in the Northeast for only three years. The corporation formed a
subsidiary and transferred all of the assets used in its Northeastern
operations to the subsidiary. The subsidiary took over all opera-
tions formerly conducted by the parent in the Northeast, and the
parent immediately ceased all operations in that part of the country.
One month after the new corporation was formed the parent
corporation distributed to its stockholders all of its stock in the
subsidiary. There were valid business reasons for the entire trans-
action, and tax avoidance was not a motivating factor. The Tax
Court held that receipt of the stock constituted taxable income to
the stockholders. Held, reversed. This transaction met all the
requisites for a tax-free distribution under section 355 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Estate of Lockwood v. Commissioner,
350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965).
Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 represents the
main statutory provision for the non-recognition of gain or loss at
the shareholder level when there is a corporate divisive reorganiza-
tion and a distribution of stock or securities made by the corpora-
tion to the shareholders. Corporate reorganizations under section
355 have been classified as "spin-offs," "split-offs" and "split-ups."
The Code does not use these terms, and there is no official sanction
for this classification. These three types of reorganization are dis-
cussed in Chester E. Spangler, 18 T.C. 976 (1952). A spin-off
occurs when assets of a corporation are transferred to a subsidiary
corporation and the stock or securities in the subsidiary are dis-
tributed to the shareholders of the parent corporation without a
surrender of stock or securities by the shareholders. In a split-off
the shareholders surrender a part of their stock or securities in the
parent corporation for stock or securities of a subsidiary corporation.
A split-up occurs when the parent corporation transfers its assets
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